HTML5 Zero Configuration Covert Channels: Security Risks and Challenges by Farina, Jason et al.
HTML5 ZERO CONFIGURATION COVERT
CHANNELS: SECURITY RISKS AND CHALLENGES
Jason Farina Mark Scanlon Stephen Kohlmann
Nhien-An Le-Khac Tahar Kechadi
School of Computer Science & Informatics,
University College Dublin, Ireland.
{jason.farina, stephen.kohlmann}@ucdconnect.ie, {mark.scanlon, an.lekhac, tahar.kechadi}@ucd.ie
ABSTRACT
In recent months, a significant number of secure, cloudless file transfer services have emerged. The
aim of these services is to facilitate the secure transfer of files in a peer-to-peer (P2P) fashion over the
Internet without the need for centralised authentication or storage. These services can take the form
of client installed applications or entirely web browser based interfaces. Due to their P2P nature, there
is generally no limit to the file sizes involved or to the volume of data transmitted – these limitations
will purely be reliant on the capacities of either end of the transfer. By default, many of these
services provide seamless, point-to-point encryption to their users. The cyberforensic consequences
of the potential criminal use of such services are significant. The ability to easily transfer encrypted
data over the Internet opens up a range of opportunities for illegal use to cybercriminals requiring
minimal technical know-how. This paper explores a number of these services and provides an analysis
of the risks they pose to corporate and governmental security. A number of methods for the forensic
investigation of such transfers are discussed.
Keywords: Covert Transfers, Encrypted Data Transmission, Counter-forensics
1. INTRODUCTION
Sending anything larger than a small amount
of data electronically is still a cumbersome task
for many Internet users when reliant on popu-
lar online communication methods. Most email
providers will limit the file size of attachments
to something in the order of megabytes. Send-
ing larger files usually requires users to upload
the content to third party storage providers, e.g.,
Dropbox, OneDrive, box.net, etc., and provide a
link to the content to their intended recipients.
From a security standpoint, this leaves user vul-
nerable to their communication being intercepted
or duplicated and their data being downloaded
by others. Regarding the security of their data
stored on this third-party provider, users must
blindly trust this third-party to not access or
share their data with any unauthorised party.
While the requirement is ever increasing to
send larger volumes of information over the In-
ternet, the potential for third-party intercep-
tion/recording of this data has become a common
story in the general media. Recent leaks from
whistle-blowers regarding the degree of surveil-
lance conducted by large government funded spy-
ing agencies on everyday citizens has pushed the
topic of cybersecurity into the public realm. In-
creasingly, Internet users are becoming conscious
of their personal responsibility in the protection
of their digital information. This results in many
users being discontent with their personal data
stored on these third party servers – likely stored
in another jurisdiction.
To respond to this demand a number of file ex-
change/transfer services have appeared in recent
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months facilitating the secure transfer of files
in a peer-to-peer (P2P)fashion from point A to
point B. Most of these services afford the user en-
crypted end-to-end file transfer and add an addi-
tional level of anonymity compared to regular file
transfer services, e.g., email attachments, FTP or
file sharing functionality built into most instant
messaging clients. The more security conscious
users will opt for the cloudless versions of these
services. Opting for this level of control over per-
sonal information has upsides and downsides for
the end user. The upside is that the user has
precise knowledge over who has access to his/her
information and what country the data is stored
in. The downside comes in terms of reliability.
The data stored or transferred using these ser-
vices is only available if at least one host storing
the file is online.
As with most security or privacy enhancing In-
ternet services, these services are open to abuse
by cybercriminals. In effect, the additional level
of anonymity and security provided by these ser-
vices provides cybercriminals with “off-the-shelf”
counter-forensic capabilities for information ex-
change. Cybercriminal activities such as data
exfiltration, the distribution of illicit images of
children, piracy, industrial espionage, malicious
software distribution, and can all be aided by the
use of these services.
1.1 Contribution of this work
For many, the topic of covert channels immedi-
ately brings to mind some form of steganography
likely in combination with an Internet anonymis-
ing service, such as Tor and I2P. While some
work has been conducted on the reverse engi-
neering/evidence gathering of these anonymising
P2P proxy services, little work has been done in
the area of online services providing end users
with the ability to securely and covertly transfer
information from peer to peer in an largely unde-
tectable manner. This work presented as part of
this paper examines a number of popular client
application and web based services, outlines their
functionality, discusses the forensic consequences
and proposes a number methods for potentially
retrieving evidence from these services.
2. BACKGROUND READING
In order
2.1 Anonymising Services
Today there are many anonymising services avail-
able for communication and data transfer. The
popular anonymous browser Tor allows users to
explore the Internet without the risk of their loca-
tion or identity becoming known [Loesing et al.,
2010]. The Tails operating system which works
in conjunction with Tor offers an extra layer of
anonymity over traditional operating systems.
When a user is operating Tails all connections
are forced to go through the Tor network and
cryptographic tools are used to encrypt the users
data. The operating system will leave no trace of
any activity unless explicitly defined by the user.
The Invisible Internet Project, also known as
I2P is another anonymous service similar to Tor.
As I2P is designed as an anonymous network
layer users can utilise their own applications on
the network. Unlike Tor the I2P network traffic
stays on the network. I2P does not use the tra-
ditional IP/Port user identification process but
instead replaces this process with a location-
independent identifier. This process decouples a
user’s online identity and physical location [Tim-
panaro et al., 2014].
Both Tor and I2P provide anonymity to the
user with an open network of onion routers. As
the network of onion routers is run by volun-
teers it is continually growing . The result of
this network growth is an increase in anonymity
and privacy for each individual user [Herrmann
and Grothoff, 2011].
2.2 Untrusted Remote Backup
The MAIDSafe network is a P2P storage facility
that allows members to engage in a data stor-
age exchange. Each member of the network en-
ables the use of a portion of their local hard
drive by other members of the network. In re-
turn the member is given the use of an equiv-
alent amount of storage distributed across the
network and replicated to multiple locations re-
ferred to as Vaults. This allows the authorised
member access from any location and resilience
should a portion of the network not be active at
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any time. All data stored on the network is dedu-
plicated and replicated in real time with file sig-
natures to ensure integrity. In addition the data
is encrypted allowing secure storage on untrusted
remote systems. Authorised access is managed
through a two factor authentication (password
and pin). The use of the MAIDSafe network is
incentivised through SafeCoin, a cryptocurrency
that members can earn by renting out space or
providing resources such as bandwidth for file
transfers. Other users can earn SafeCoins by par-
ticipating in development of the protocol.
2.3 Types of File Transfer Attacks
Data exfiltration refers to the unauthorised ac-
cess to otherwise confidential, proprietary or sen-
sitive information. Giani et al. [2006] outlines
a number of data exfiltration methods includ-
ing most regular file transfer methods for “inside
man” attacks, e.g, HTTP, FTP, SSH and email,
and external attacks including social engineering,
botnets, privilege escalation and rootkit facili-
tated access. Detection of most of these meth-
ods is possible using a combination of firewalls
and network intrusion detection systems or deep
packet inspection [Liu et al., 2009, Sohn et al.,
2003, Cabuk et al., 2009].
2.4 The Deep-Web
The Deep-web refers to layers of internet services
and communication that is not readily accessible
to most users and is not crawled by search en-
gine crawlers. Unlike the Internet there is no one
set of protocols or formats for the Deep-Web, in-
stead deep-web is a generic term used to describe
internet communications that are managed using
closed or somehow restricted protocols. More re-
cently however, the term “deep web” has been
made synonymous with black-market sites such
as “The Silk Road”, taken offline by the FBI in
2013.
2.4.1 The FreeNet Project
The FreeNet project is a peer based distributed
Internet alternative. Users connect to FreeNet
through an installed application that uses mul-
tiple encrypted connections to mask the source
and destination IP addresses as well as the traf-
fic and data location itself. FreeNet peers, or
nodes, store fragments of data in a distributed
fashion. The number of times a data item is repli-
cated is dependant on the demand for that data.
More popular files have more available sources
resulting in better availability and faster access
times for the requesters. The layered encryp-
tion of the connections provides an effective de-
fence against network sniffing attacks and also
complicates network forensic analysis. FreeNet
by default was deployed in OpenNet configura-
tion, meaning connections could be made with
a random set of nodes from all of the FreeNet
nodes available. Users can choose to instead use
a DarkNet configuration where only known nodes
are routed through resulting in a small world
topology for the network. The choice of OpenNet
or Darknet is not binary however as the user can
choose to employ a mix of both to whatever de-
gree they wish however small world topology with
random connections may result in inefficiencies.
DarkNet routing tables are created using loca-
tion swapping to populate efficient routes based
on relative node distance . This feature gave rise
to an attack, Pitch Black, which caused degra-
dation of DarkNet performance and security by
tricking the network into moving disproportion-
ate amounts of data to individual peers by falsely
reporting node distances to corrupt the routes
[Evans et al., 2007].
The Pitch Black attack will only work against a
DarkNet configuration but OpenNet is inherently
less secure than DarkNet. In OpenNet, any user
can, theoretically, enumerate and connect to all
available nodes and perform traffic correlation to
trace back to the original requester. This ability
to harvest addresses and to identify the initial
seed nodes results in OpenNet configurations be-
ing very easy to block with a firewall by blacklist-
ing a dynamic list of known nodes and DarkNet
is the recommended setup for users to employ.
2.4.2 Tor
The Tor Network is another networking protocol
designed to provide anonymity. Initially Tor, an
acronym for “The Onion Router”, just provided
random routes with three encrypted connections
before exiting through an exit node. Exit nodes
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are selected based on the resources available at
the exit node and the destination port of the
users traffic. If the exit node is not configured
to accept traffic destined for a service’s port it
will not accept any routing requests bound for
that port.
Tor works by creating generating a circuit one
relay at a time between Tor nodes before emerg-
ing to the internet through the exit nodes men-
tioned above. Each relay only knows the sys-
tem it is receiving data from and the server that
it is sending data on to next. Once the circuit
is established all traffic for that particular ses-
sion is routed along the same path. Should the
user decide to use a different service or visit a
different website, a new circuit would be gen-
erated and used. Tor is a SOCKS (Socket Se-
cure) proxy meaning any TCP application that
can be made SOCKS aware can be used through
the Tor network. Software that is not SOCKS
aware, like the Gnutella P2P protocol for exam-
ple, will run through Tor but will not properly
anonymise their traffic. A Gnutella peer will still
send its true IP address as part of any QueryHit
message. The same is true for any BitTorrent
Sync (a popular cloudless Dropbox alternative)
traffic attempted through Tor.
Sometimes a user can opt to not utilise an
exit node and instead browse content on ser-
vices hosted within the Tor network itself. These
web pages, such as the Silk Road, are known
as Hidden Services and are anonymised systems
just like the clients visiting. This anonymisa-
tion would normally make any form of depend-
able routing impossible as any DNS lookup would
not be able to report a static IP address for the
service for the client system to connect to. In-
stead, hidden services use a distributed hash ta-
ble (DHT) and a known service advertising node
to inform clients of their presence and the path
to the service provided. The process of making a
Hidden Service available is as follows:
1. The Hidden Service (HS) picks a public
“identity key”, Is, and an associated security
key Ss.
2. An Onion Identifier Os is generated as the
function H(Is) where H is the first 80 bits
of the 160-bit SHA1 hash base32 encoded.
This gives a 16 byte string that then has the
TLD .onion attached
3. HS constructs three circuits each with 3 re-
lays but no exit node. These relays will act
as introduction nodes to the service.
4. A descriptor is then signed by the HS with
the secret key Ss and the Public Is along
with the relay IPs are published to the DHT
using a time period as an index.
5. The visiting client system requests the de-
scriptor from the DHT and generates a cir-
cuit to one of the Introduction relays.
6. Once the connection is established the Client
and the Introduction system agree on a ren-
dezvous relay RP for both the server and the
client to use as a common relay to create a
bridge
7. Introduction relay informs the HS of the RP
address and both the HS and the client set
up circuits meeting at the RP
Due to the HS reliance on DHT and HS Direc-
tory servers to perform the introductions for Tor
users, Biryukov et al. [2013] were able to demon-
strate a denial of service attack on a HS by imper-
sonating the HS directory servers acting as Intro-
duction nodes. They were also able to crawl the
DHT to harvest Onion Identifiers over a period
of 2 days to provide a more accurate index of the
content of the DeepWeb contained within Tor.
This approach could be useful when attempting
to stall a HS until it can be properly identified.
Botnet C&C nodes could be prevented from issu-
ing updates or harvesting reports from the bots
through the methods outlined in their paper.
2.5 File Sharing Services Built on
Anonymising Networks
OnionShare is a file sharing application that
leverages the anonymity of Tor to provide secure
file transfers for its users. File transfers are di-
rect from uploader to recipient though both users
utilise the Tor browser to participate. Onion-
Share itself is a python based application that
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sets up a fileshare on the local system as a lim-
ited web server. This web server is then adver-
tised as a Tor Hidden Service using the built in
functionality of the Tor browser. The applica-
tion uses random data to generate a 16 character
onion address and more random data to generate
a unique name for the file being shared to use as
a reference for.
The process used by OnionShare is as follows:
1. Uploader starts Tor Browser to provide an
entry point for OnionShare to the Tor net-
work.
OnionShare is started and a temporary di-
rectory is created in the users’ default temp
folder. All randomly generated names in
OnionShare follow the same procedure:
(a) A number of random bytes are gener-
ated using os.random. 8 are generated
for a directory/host name and 16 for
the filename "slug" used to generate
the file portion of the share URL
(b) These random bytes are SHA-256 and
the rightmost 16 characters of the re-
sulting hash are carved
(c) h is then base32 encoded, all charac-
ters are converted to lower case and any
trailing ‘=’ signs are removed
2. The result is then used as a URL using the
format <host>.onion/<fileID> and this is
the url the Tor browser advertises to the in-
troduction nodes and registers on DHT.
3. The uploader then sends the URL to the
downloader who must use the URL within
a timeframe (24 hours by default) or the
signature of the file HS timestamp will not
match, a process controlled by the ItsDan-
gerous library for python. In addition to
this time limit, OnionShare also utilises a
download counter which has a default value
of 1. Once the number of downloads suc-
cessfully initiated matches this counter the
link is no longer considered valid and all in-
coming URLs with the sae file signature are
refused.
This combination of time and availability in
conjunction with the anonymity of Tor HS makes
OnionShare traffic extremely difficult to analyse
effectively. If the traffic is observed then the link
is already invalidated. Similarly, if the file is dis-
covered on a local filesystem by an investigator.
3. INVESTIGATIVE
TECHNIQUES
While no directly related work has been pub-
lished at the time of writing, there are a num-
ber of digital evidence acquisition methods pub-
lished for related services. This section outlines
a number of related investigation techniques and
analyses their relevancy to the forensic recovery
of evidence from covert file transfer services.
3.1 Cloud Storage Forensics
Forensics of cloud storage utilities can prove chal-
lenging, as presented by Chung et al. [2012a].
The difficulty arises because, unless complete lo-
cal synchronisation has been performed, the data
can be stored across various distributed loca-
tions. For example, it may only reside in tem-
porary local files, volatile storage (such as the
system’s RAM) or dispersed across multiple dat-
acentres of the service provider’s cloud storage
facility. Any digital forensic examination of these
systems must pay particular attention to the
method of access, usually the Internet browser
connecting to the service provider’s storage ac-
cess page (https://www.dropbox.com/login for
Dropbox for example). This temporary access
serves to highlight the importance of live foren-
sic techniques when investigating a suspect ma-
chine as a “pull out the plug” anti-forensic tech-
nique would not only lose access to any currently
opened documents but may also lose any cur-
rently stored sessions or other authentication to-
kens that are stored in RAM.
Martini and Choo [2013] published the results
of a cloud storage forensics investigation on the
ownCloud service from both the perspective of
the client and the server elements of the service.
They found that artefacts were found on both
the client machine and on the server facilitating
the identification of files stored by different users.
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The module client application was found to store
authentication and file metadata relating to files
stored on the device itself and on files only stored
on the server. Using the client artefacts, the au-
thors were able to decrypt the associated files
stored on the server instance.
3.2 Network Forensics
Network Forensic Analysis Tools (NFATs) are de-
signed to work alongside traditional network se-
curity practises, i.e., intrusion detection systems
(IDSs) and firewalls. They preserve a long term
record of network traffic and facilitates quick
analysis of any identified issues [Corey et al.,
2002]. Most firewalls allow HTTP and HTTPS
traffic through to allow users behind the firewall
to have access to regular web services which oper-
ate over these protocols. With regards to the web
based covert file transfer services (outlined in de-
tail in Section4 below), blocking network traffic
to these systems would require the maintenance
of a comprehensive firewall list of such servers to
ensure no unauthorised data exfiltration. NFATs
collecting this information will only have the abil-
ity to capture the encrypted packets, their desti-
nation and associated metadata. Identifying pre-
cisely what has been transferred will likely prove
impossible for network administrators.
The issue with always-on active network foren-
sics is dealing real-time with the large volumes
of traffic involved. One approach to overcome
the massive volume of network data to process is
to simply record every packet sent and received
from the Internet, in the similar manner to the
tactic employed in the case outlined by Garfinkel
[2002]. This would facilitate an after-the-fact re-
construction of any data breaches to aid in de-
termining precisely what was compromised.
3.3 Deep-Web Forensics
Although Tor and I2P are designed for users
to communicate and transfer data on the Inter-
net anonymously it is still viable and possible
for investigators to gather user specific informa-
tion. The process of an investigation into the
Tor network requires advanced digital forensic
knowledge as traditional investigation methods
used for standard networks fail to heed the de-
sired results. Loesing et al. [2010] published a
study measuring statistical data in the Tor net-
work. The study is weighted towards protecting
the users anonymity while using Tor but nonethe-
less shows that it is technically possible to gather
data on Tor users by setting up a Tor relay and
logging all relayed user traffic.
When users install Tor the software first con-
nects to one of the directory authorities. The di-
rectory authorities are operated by trusted indi-
viduals of Tor and from these authorities the Tor
software downloads the list of currently available
Tor nodes. These nodes are relay servers that are
run by volunteers of Tor. The Tor client then se-
lects three nodes from those available and builds
an encrypted channel to the entry node. An en-
crypted channel is then built from the entry node
to the middle node, and lastly this channel con-
nects to the exit node.
The exit node is not aware of the entry node
or who the client is and the entry node does not
know which exit node is ultimately selected by
the client. It is possible to de-anonymise streams
by only recording every 1 in every 2000 packets
[Murdoch and Zieliński, 2007].
Although Loesing et al. demonstrate the pro-
cess of exposing traffic by port and countries
of connecting clients the results remain masked.
The aim of the work was to outline a process
by which researchers can safely measure network
data in anonymity systems while protecting the
privacy of the user.
Blond et al. [2011] demonstrated the results of
an attack on the Tor anonymity network that re-
vealed 10,000 IP addresses over 23 days. The au-
thors used the attack to obtain the IP addresses
of BitTorrent users on Tor. The study found that
72 percent of users were specifically using Tor to
connect to the tracker. The authors launched
their attacks through six instrumented Tor exit
nodes resulting in 9 percent of all Tor streams
being traced. Moreover, the paper analyses the
type of content discovered in the attack culminat-
ing in the result that the existence of an under-
ground BitTorrent ecosystem existing on Tor is
plausible. Alongside these attacks Tor users were
also profiled. Using BitTorrent as the insecure
application they hijacked the statistical proper-
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Figure 1: The basic HTML5 data transfer pro-
cess
ties of the DHT and the tracker responses.
4. EVOLUTION OF HTML5
POWERED COVERT FILE
TRANSFER SERVICES
Preamble
4.1 Basic HTML5 File Transfer
Basic HTML5 File transfer as depicted in figure1
is accomplished using native browser APIs that
allow a user to utilise a data transfer object.
This object consists of a customisable array of
key:value pairs that represent a group of file ob-
jects. This associative array is then accessible by
client side scripts run from a web page or web
application. These scripts must first be down-
loaded and allowed to run by the local user (this
depends on the trust setting for the website being
visited). Any element can be added to the array
through a Drag and Drop (DnD) functionality or
files can be added though a file browser interface.
The actions available by default are:
• copy: A copy of the source item may be
made at the new location.
• move: An item may be moved to a new lo-
cation.
• link: A link may be established to the source
at the new location.
• copyLink: A copy or link operation is per-
mitted.
• copyMove: A copy or move operation is per-
mitted.
• linkMove: A link or move operation is per-
mitted.
• all: All operations are permitted.
• none: The item may not be dropped
if the element added to the array is a file
then the element is passed to a FileReader ob-
ject that copies the data contained in the file
to localstorage or session storage depend-
ing on the settings of the web application. Lo-
cal Storage is shared across all browser sessions
currently active, session storage is only avail-
able to the owning application or window (for
browsers with multiple tabs or windows). This
local/session storage behaves very similarly to
the standard cookie storage but with hugely in-
creased capacity. ( 5MB for Chrome, Firefox and
Opera, 10MB for Internet Explorer - DnD native
is only available in version 9+ of IE - web storage
in version 8+, and 25MB for Blackberry).
For basic Data transfer, the Filereader reads
the entire file indicated into RAM for process-
ing. Once stored in webstorage a file can only be
accessed by local actions that have permission
to access that web storage area such as client
side scripts downloaded from the controlling web
page or session. These scripts can use any script-
ing language but usually JQuery, Javascript or
AJAX. The local client can also call scripts to
run on the remote server in order to pass vari-
ables or prepare for the establishment of addi-
tional sessions are required.
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Figure 2: traditional VOIP data vs DTLS-SRTP
4.2 Cryptographically enhanced
HTML5 data channels
Following on from their acquisition of ON2 in
February 2010, Google continued to develop a
browser to browser data transfer protocol that
was made open source in 2011 when it was
adopted by W3C as a standard for HTML5.
The protocol, which supported Real Time Com-
munication between browsers was released as
WebRTC 1.0, was developed to provide P2P
voice, video and data transfers between browsers
without an additional software requirements.
WebRTC, provides a collection of protocols and
methods as well as a group of codec libraries that
can be accessed via a javascript API . The spec-
ification for WebRTC can be found on the W3C
developer site http://www.w3.org/TR/webrtc/.
WebRTC improved data transfer over the stan-
dard HTML5 script based method by introduc-
ing data integrity, source authentication and end
to end encryption. This is accomplished through
the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) Modadugu and Rescorla [2004] exten-
sion to handle key exchange for the Secure Real-
time Transport Protocol (SRTP). The use of
DTLS-SRTP differs from standard VOIP encryp-
tion by removing the need to trust SIP relays
that form the path between the source and des-
tination.
In the image 2 the standard VOIP method of
communication is displayed alongside the newer
WebRTC method. Both systems start with es-
tablishing a signalling and control path to handle
non-sensitive data such as connection auditing
packets. In VOIP the data stream would follow
this established path and traffic between Client
A and Client B involving relay through Relays
1 and 2. Unless the user fully trusts both re-
lays and the security of the network path between
each node on the network, there is a risk of an
adversary eavesdropping on the data stream and
either manipulating the content in transit or cap-
turing it for offline inspection.
Under WebRTC, the signalling path is still
used but through the use of Interactive Connec-
tivity Establishment (ICE) the protocol initiates
a direct connection between the endpoint clients
allowing data to be transferred directly while the
control signalling continues to follow the origi-
nal path. To allow for clients obfuscated by fire-
walls that perform NAT operations to present a
public facing IP WebRTC uses Session Traversal
Utilities for NAT (STUN) to allow NAT traver-
sal so private IP ranges can connect directly to
to one another across public networks. Should
STUN fail due to an inability for direct connec-
tion, WebRTC will employ Traversal Using Relay
NAT (TURN protocol) which will designate one
trusted intermediary server to act as a relay for
the Client traffic.
5. ANALYSIS OF EXISTING
SERVICES
Free services such as PipeBytes and Any Send
http://getanysend.com as outlined in Table 1
allow a user to transfer files of any size via the
browser without the need for external software.
There are many similar services that a user can
access easily online and this abundance of ser-
vices is of particular interest to digital forensic in-
vestigators. As can be seen in Table 1, PipeBytes
and AeroFS also offer anonymity to there users.
AeroFS also offer a private cloud whereby abso-
lutely no data or communication is transferred or
stored on the AeroFS servers. Although AeroFS
is primarily marketed as a business service it is
possible for this private cloud to be used for il-
licit and illegal transfers. Services such as Qik-
Share and Transfer Big Files have added the chal-
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Sharefest 3 3 7 7 7 7 3 3
PipeBytes 3 3 7 3 3 7 7 3
JustBeamIt 7 3 7 7 7 3 7 7
Transfer Big Files 3 3 3 7 7 3 3 3
Infinit 3 3 3 3 7 7 3 3
Any Send 3 3 3 3 7 3 3 7
Rejetto 7 7 3 3 7 7 3 3
QikShare 7 3 3 7 7 3 3 3
AeroFS 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Table 1: Comparison of Browser Based Transfer Services
lenge of deciphering mobile compatibility for the
digital forensic investigator. Multiple device and
cross platform file sharing offers great speed and
flexibility to the standard user. The downside to
this is not the security of these file transfers but
it is the lack of a tool that can sift out the ille-
gal and illicit data transfers. All services listed
in Table 1 with the exception of PipeBytes and
JustBeamIt offer persistence storage. Although
some of the services only offer this as a paid op-
tion it is quite feasible for a user to select these
services to store incriminating material without
risking a trace on the users local machine. Ta-
ble 1 is not extensive and it is important to note
that there are a multitude of these services avail-
able online.
5.1 HTML5 Enabled Peer-to-Peer
Transfer
sharefest.me is a file-sharing “one-to-many” based
website that aims to dynamically generate and
maintain file-sharing swarms by connecting peers
that are interested in sharing the same data.
Like the BitTorrent protocol, multiple peers are
utilised simultaneously to transfer portions of
the data thus increasing download speeds by
avoiding the bottleneck that is the lower up-
load speed of a standard ADSL internet con-
nection. In order to achieve this, Sharefest is
built on Peer5’s (https://peer5.com/) platform
for a distributed internet, a P2P data trans-
fer mesh network that utilises the capabilities
of the browser without additional plugins be-
yond a WebRTC capable browser. WebRTC is
a HTML5 integrated utility for providing data
channels for real time communication such as
VOIP or IM but which can also be used to trans-
fer static data files. WebRTC is handled by de-
fault in Chrome (version 33+), Mozilla (version
31+) and Opera (version 25+) desktop browsers
as well as Android browser (version 37) and
Chrome for Android (versions 38+).
As depicted in figure 3 the Sharefest pro-
cess is quite straightforward in design. The
sharefest.me server acts as a transfer control
server that records all files being offered for shar-
ing and matches the resource to the client sys-
tem request. In the scenario depicted, Client
A has a complete file that it wants to share.
Client A connects to the Sharefest server at
https://www.sharefest.me/ over port 443 and
negotiate TLS1.2 where possible using SPDY
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Figure 3: Sharefest P2P mesh over WebRTC
if available for web content transfer. Given a
full range of options the Sharefest server ne-
gotiates the use of the ECDHE-ECDSA with
AES 128 and GCM 256. As required by
the IETF RFC 4492 (http://tools.ietf.org/
html/rfc449) the Sharefest server passes the
Curve details as part of its serverkeyexchange
packet.
Once a secure path is established the server
delivers a small set of helper scripts to the client:
• files.js : a script to gather file details from
the client
• ui.js : a script to control the update and
display of the file management interface on
the page.
Once a file has been selected for sharing the
Sharefest server assigns a code value in the form
of a URL such as https://www.sharefest.me/
67509cb244257b6643540dda512f8171 where the
number after the domain name is the swarmID
for this file. The SwarmID has 32 characters but
is not based on the MD5 of the file, instead it ap-
pears to be derived from the Sharefest crypto.js
script which incorporates SHA3 in a lengthy cal-
culation. The swarmID is deterministic meaning
that any client sharing the same file will identi-
fied with the same swarmID.
Once clients offering and requesting the same
file or fileset are identified the Sharefest server
acts as a central traffic control and initiates a
STUN connection directly between the partici-
pating clients. In figure 3 Clients A C and D
are all participating in the swarm for File 1 but
Client B is not involved. The STUN connection
consists of each pair of clients issuing BIND re-
quests from uploader to downloader using STUN
over UDP which allows each host ot discover its
own public facing IP address in order to create
end to end connections through a NAT gateway
or firewall. Each BIND / Confirm pair is re-
issued on a regular, short, interval to ensure the
connection remains intact. Once the STUN ses-
sion is active the two peers negotiate a WebRTC
session and switch over to the protocol’s encryp-
tion. ACK and STUN confirmation messages
continue to be sent to and from the Sharefest
server and the peers throughout the exchange.
Sharefest is an example of P2P privacy in a dis-
tributed network ensuring that data can be trans-
ferred without risk of interception. This level of
privacy comes at a cost though as the ability of
IT security to inspect the traffic is greatly di-
minished with the level of encryption in use at
all stages of the transfer. Packet analysis can
detect the IP addresses in use but without ac-
cess to the key to decrypt the traffic the content
being transferred is extremely difficult to deter-
mine. One option available to network admins
is to block the use of the sharefest.me service by
blacklisting the URL. This would have the ef-
fect of preventing casual usage of the service but
the source for Sharefest is publicly available on
Github https://github.com/Peer5/Sharefest
along with instruction and support for installa-
tion of a personal server. Peer5 also provide the
API key for free to anyone interested in the code.
This means that any IP or URL could become a
Sharefest server.
One method of detecting the use of this ap-
plication is the STUN traffic generated once
a peer is identified and connection is initi-
ated. In testing an average of 5 STUN negotia-
tion/confirmation exchanges were recorded every
second depending on the level of file transfer data
passing between the peers. This level of “noise”
would make the user of Sharefest relatively easy
to discover and no effort is made to obfuscate the
communicating peers.
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In an attempt to determine if this lack of
anonymisation could be overcome, we attempted
to run Sharefest through a Tor circuit but all
three transfer utilities (JustBeamIt, PipeBytes
and Sharefest) failed to complete the initial setup
with the relevant server. This was tested using
Tor Browser installed on a Windows 7 VMWare
image. A possible alternative may be to attempt
the use of a SOCKS aware proxy to direct the
traffic to and from the application. Alternatively
a server running Sharefest could be adapted to
run as a Tor Service but this would not alleviate
the lack of privacy experienced once data transfer
was initiated between peers.
5.2 JustBeamIt
An example of a basic HTML 5 transfer ap-
plication is the file transfer service offered at
http://www.justbeamit.com. The sending user
connects to the server over port 8080 (alternate
HTTP port) and performs a standard TCP hand-
shake followed by a series of HTTP GET requests
for client side JavaScripts.
• JustBeamIt.js - the base script that sets up
the variables and defines the communication
functions
• BrowserDetectUtility.js - determines if the
user browser can properly support HTML5
data transfers
• FileHandler.js - manages the transfer to and
from the file array. Handles the array re-
set and webpage notifications if the array is
emptied.
• UploadManager.js - defines the drag and
drop actions and defines the “landing zone”
• UploadHandler.js - Determines if the Client
needs to use XMLHttpRequest (XHR) or
FORM based uploading and generates the
QRCode.
• UploadHandler.XHR.js and UploadHan-
dler.FORM.js - the actual uploading scripts
There is an option to drag and drop a file into
the browser but in this instance the file browser
is used to select a file from the local user pictures
folder. Once selected the button “Create Link”
is clicked and the link http://www.justbeamit
.com/di33x is created along with a QRCode for
mobile use. This link can copied and sent to the
receiving system, in the meantime the local client
is redirected to a relay server URL for the upload
itself (http://b1.justbeamit.com/. On the re-
mote system, the URL is pasted into a browser
and the system and the remote client loads
http://www.justbeamit.com and immediately
requests the download token for the file di33x and
downloads and runs the set of JavaScripts. The
server passes along the token along with the cur-
rent download status (upload waiting) and the
file descriptor (name, size, extension). Once the
remote user clicks on the link to download the
browser is redirected to http://b1.justbeamit
.com where the file transfer is performed. Once
complete the local user is notified that the trans-
fer has been successful. The token used to down-
load is now invalidated and a new link must be
generated if the file is to be shared again. Simi-
larly, there is a 1000 second timeout period dur-
ing which the shared file must be downloaded
before the opportunity expires and a new share
token must be generated.
While this method of file transfer provides ease
of use to the end user, all transfers are performed
via unencrypted traffic. The data being trans-
ferred is susceptible to any form of eavesdropping
capable of detecting traffic on any network seg-
ment the traffic passes through. The open nature
of the transfer and the client side execution of
scripts (as well as the open exchange of tokens)
allow for trivial man-in-the-middle (MITM) at-
tacks where an adversary capable of eavesdrop-
ping can use a proxy or other interception util-
ity to alter the packets in transit. One possible
scenario would be the substitution of a harmless
UploadManager.js script for something less be-
nign as identified by Jang-JaccardJang-Jaccard
and Nepal [2014] as a rising risk or, even ex-
changing the generated download token for one
that leads to a virus or other form of malware.
From a security standpoint, defence against
the use of this service is quite straightforward.
Because of the application’s use of a centralised
set of servers, a standard firewall rule to block
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access to http://*.justbeamit.com would pre-
vent any upload but also any attempt to down-
load.
5.3 PipeBytes
A second system of this type is PipeBytes.com.
Just as with JustBeamIt PipeBytes allows a
user to drag and drop files into the browser
or use a file browser to select files for upload.
Also as with JustBeamIt, there is a standard
connection to the PipeBytes.com server though
this time it is over the standard HTTP port 80.
Once connected the uploading client downloads
a series of scripts to be run locally and the site
itself is built on the freely available open source
YUI API http://yuilibrary.com/ . However,
one immediate difference is that, as part of
the packet traffic (which again is unencrypted)
the client system uploads a random number
generated using the MATH.RANDOM javascript
function. This random number (between 0 and
1) is used as a parameter for a serverside script
called from the upload-callbacks.js line:
YAHOO.util.Connect.asyncRequest(’GET’,
’getkey.php?r=’ + Math.random(), callback)
the getkey.php page that is output from the
server side script contains a key value that is
used to populate the URL / Code box option
on the webpage. The value of the key is use
din subsequent scripts and is derived from
o.responsetext. Once a key have been generated
and the upload button is clicked, the local client
issues a POST request for put.py on the server
using the key and a second random number as
parameters. The file is then uploaded to the
server as an unencrypted transfer. While the
system waits for the remote client to connect,
the local uploader issues frequent GET requests
for status updates.
Once the remote client receives the URL or
code to initiate the download they connect to the
same url (http://www.PipeBytes.net over port
80 to input their download code (the Key) where
they will be redirected to one of the hosting
servers (in testing only host03.PipeBytes.net was
discovered though the naming convention would
suggest that others do exist or have existed).
The connection request takes the form of:
GET/get.php?key =
103223658539867HTTP/1.1
which is acknowledged with a standard HTTP
200 OK message from the server. The transfer
of the file then commences and the traffic is
delivered unencrypted.
While initially this version of the system ap-
peared to provide more privacy and security by
having the key generated and managed by scripts
run on the server or the systems hosted by de-
veloper.Yahoo.com, the plain text transfers from
server to peer leave it vulnerable to the same
MITM attacks as justbeamit.com. In fact, any
file upload system that uses open channels to
transfer authentication data or transfers the data
itself in the clear cannot be said to be either se-
cure or private systems. For sensitive data trans-
fers a more robust alternative was required.
6. FORENSIC
CONSEQUENCES OF
“UNTRACEABLE” FILE
TRANSFER
The facilitation of “untraceable” or “anonymous”
file exchange can lead to a number of potential
malicious use cases. For each of the scenarios out-
lined below, an added dimension can be created
by the originator of the content: time. Due to
the ability to create “one-time” or temporary ac-
cess to any piece of content, the timeframe where
evidence may be recovered from remote sharing
peers might be very short.
6.1 Cybercriminal Community
Backup
Unmonitored covert transfer could be used to cre-
ate a “share and share alike” model for the remote
encrypted backup of illegal content. The sharing
of these backups onto multiple remote machines
effectively could provide the user with a cloudless
backup solution requiring minimal trust with any
remote users. The encryption of the data before
distribution to the community can ensure that
only the owner will ever have access to decrypt
the data. Trust only comes into play should the
remote nodes delete the information or it other-
wise becoming unrecoverable. Having a secure,
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encrypted connection to a remote backup might
be desirable to cybercriminals enabling the use of
a kill-switch to their local storage devices should
the need arise.
6.2 Secure Covert Messaging
For example, the proof of concept based
on the BitTorrent Sync Protocol found at
http://missiv.es/. The application currently
operates by saving messages to an “outbox” folder
in a synchronised share between peers that has
a read only key shared to the person you want
to receive the message. They in turn send you a
read only key to their outbox. One to many can
be achieved by sharing the read only key with
more than one person but no testing has been
done with synchronisation timing issues yet and
key management may become an issue as a new
outbox would be needed for each private conver-
sation required.
6.3 Industrial Espionage
Many companies are aware of the dangers of
allowing unmonitored traffic on their networks.
However, quite often corporate IT departments
enforce a blocking of P2P technologies through
protocol blocking rules on their perimeter fire-
walls. This has the effect of cutting off any file-
sharing clients installed on the LAN from the
outside world. In addition to Deep Packet In-
spection (DPI) to investigate the data portion of
a network packet passing the inspection point,
basic blocking of known IP address blacklists
in firewall rulesets can be used. The difficulty
in blocking HTTP based file transfers is that
the technology is likely used during regular em-
ployee Internet usage. HTTP transfers can be
used when emailing file attachments or adding
items to content management system. One addi-
tional scenario where these services could be used
would be to transfer files within a LAN and sub-
sequent external exfiltration from a weaker/less
monitored part of the network, e.g., guest wire-
less access.
6.4 Piracy
Like any other P2P technology, the ability to
transfer files in a direct manner from peer to peer
lends itself well to the unauthorised distribution
of copyrighted material. The sharing of copy-
righted multimedia, software, etc., between peers
using these covert services is less likely to lead to
prosecution compared with public piracy on open
file-sharing networks such as BitTorrent.
6.5 Alternative to Server Based
Website Hosting
This scenario involves the creation of static web-
sites served through a shared archive. These web-
sites could be directly viewed on each user’s lo-
cal machine facilitating the easy distribution of
any illegal material. The local copies of the web-
site could receive updates from the “webmaster”
through the extraction of archived updated dis-
tributed in a similar manner as the original.
6.6 Malicious Software Distribution
Due to the lack of any cloud based virus scan-
ning, e.g., provided by most email providers and
a number of file synchronisation providers, the
direct unscanned transfer of files could facilitate
the distribution of malware to regular Internet
users.
7. POTENTIAL FORENSIC
INVESTIGATION
TECHNIQUES
Assuming access (physical or remote) can be ac-
quired to either end of the file transfer, then a
live acquisition of the evidence should be attain-
able. Performing evidence acquisition after the
fact would rely on traditional hard drive and
memory forensic techniques to see if any rem-
nants of the network communication remain.
The investigation of the unauthorised trans-
fer for information through one of these ser-
vices without access to either end of the transfer
can prove extremely difficult. Assuming through
some external means, the precise date and time
of the transfer were discovered. The only method
available to law enforcement is to effectively wire-
tap the transfer by running a software or hard-
ware based deep packet inspection tool on the
network at either end of the transfer.
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To date there has been keen interest in re-
search performed on the forensic examination
of file sharing utilities and the type of security
risks they pose. Chung et al. [2012b] outlined
a best practise approach to the investigation of
file sharing using cloud based storage-as-a-service
(StaaS) utilities such as Dropbox, iCloud and
One Drive. In 2014, Federici [2014] presented
Cloud Data Imager (CDI) a utility developed by
the Italian Polizia to automate the retrieval of
cloud based storage artefacts from a suspect sys-
tem and use these credentials to access their se-
cure storage online.
Scanlon et al. [2014] described a methodology
that leveraged the processes used by persistent
file synchronisation services to ensure data in-
tegrity to retrieve data that would otherwise have
been inaccessible. This could be as a result of de-
liberate obfuscation such as encryption or anti-
forensic activities or it could be caused by an
error in the imaging process. The methodology
presented utilised the need for synchronisation
group ongoing communication to enumerate re-
mote peers and to identify any authorised peers
that could provide a forensically true copy of the
suspect data.
Emerging file transfer utilities, such as the
purely browser based file transfer utilities based
on WebRTC, do not advertise persistence of
availability nor integrity checking beyond the ini-
tial transfer and in many cases are only associ-
ated for the length of time that both parties are
online and in communication, directly or other-
wise. After this time, such as with Onionshare
for example, the address of the file source will
change completely and no longer be available to
any peer authorised or otherwise.
This ephemeral nature of data transfer can
make any attempt to verify or re-create the cir-
cumstances of the file transfer difficult if not im-
possible and it very much depends on the features
of the individual application being employed.
8. CONCLUSION
The evolution of online file transfer systems is
becoming more and more covert through em-
ploying encryption-based, server less, P2P proto-
cols. The development of HTML5 and JavaScript
based services proves particularly interesting
from a digital forensic perspective. As these tech-
nologies mature, a future can be easily envisioned
whereby the investigation and evidence retrieval
from these systems will prove extremely diffi-
cult, if not entirely impossible. Daisy-chaining
a number of the technologies outlined in this pa-
per has the potential to enable malicious users to
securely transfer any desired information to an-
other user/machine without arousing suspicions
of system administrators. Identifying the use of
a HTTPS, browser-based P2P file transfer with
relatively small transfer sizes might prove pro-
hibitively difficult. The investigation of these
transfers may prove cost prohibitive in terms of
both time and money for law enforcement to
comprehensively investigate.
8.1 Future Work
Pramble
• Automated Detection of HTML5 based
Data Exfiltration – Unencrypted Transfers,
Encrypted Transfers
• Approximate Hashing – Approximate hash-
ing facilitates the... When the blacklist gets
too large and performance issues are encoun-
tered
• Tor Browser Plugin –
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